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Cartesian Certainty, Realism and Scientific Inference 




In the Principles, Descartes explains several observable phenomena showing 
that they are caused by special arrangements of unobservable microparticles. 
Despite these microparticles being unobservable, many passages suggest that 
he was very confident that these explanations were correct. In other passages, 
however, Descartes points out that these explanations merely hold the status of 
‘suppositions’ or ‘conjectures’ that could be wrong. The aim of this chapter is 
to clarify this apparent conflict. I argue that the possibility of natural 
explanations being wrong should be understood as these explanations not being 
absolutely certain, but as being morally certain. Cartesian explanations rely on 
what Ernan McMullin calls retroduction, which is a mode of inference that 
justifies beliefs in concrete unobservable entities and processes. I use as a foil 
the debate in contemporary philosophy of science between scientific realism 
and instrumentalism, and argue that for Descartes we could indeed have 
knowledge of the unobservable world. In that sense, he was closer to being a 
scientific realist.  
 
§1. Cartesian Explanations and Unobservable Particles 
In contemporary philosophy of science, instrumentalism is the view that holds that the aim of 
science is empirical adequacy. The idea is that scientific theories are supposed to account only for 
observable phenomena, and the epistemic attitude toward claims regarding unobservable entities 
and processes should be agnosticism. Scientific realism, on the other hand, holds that the aim of 
science is truth. On this view, beliefs in the existence of the objects and processes posited by our 
best scientific theories are to some extent warranted, regardless of whether these objects and 
processes are observable by humans. Most versions of scientific realism restrict their commitments 
to the entities and processes posited by the best scientific explanations, and the criteria for 
classifying explanations are the so-called theoretical virtues. There is, of course, wide 
disagreement concerning what exactly these virtues may be, but it is generally believed that best 
explanations subsume their explananda under more general regularities (generality), while at the 
same time positing the fewest amount of explanatory entities or processes (unificatory power), 
arranged in the simplest possible way (simplicity). In turn, if an explanation gives rise to further 
developments of the theory, it is said to be fruitful (fertility).  
This framework from contemporary philosophy of science will help me illuminate an 
interpretative debate concerning the nature of Cartesian explanations. In Part 4 of the Principles, 
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Descartes provides a long list of explanations of several observable phenomena, showing that these 
phenomena are effects of interactions, by physical contact, of unobservable micro particles (for 
example, he explains attraction between magnets in terms of the pulling of strings composed of 
screw-shaped micro particles). Appealing to these particles is not a return to medieval ‘occult’ 
qualities. Rather, they make perfect sense in Cartesian metaphysics of science. After our pure 
reason grasps the essential properties of matter as an extended substance, we only need to accept 
that matter is indefinitely divisible to conclude that there can be very small particles with exactly 
the same properties of concrete, observable objects, namely size, shape, and motion as described 
by the laws of movement outlined earlier in the Principles (AT VIIIA 324/CSMI 286-7). 
According to Descartes, the reason why these particles are unobservable by humans is simply that: 
“[the] nerves, which must be set in motion by objects in order to produce a sensation, are 
not themselves very minute… hence they cannot be set in motion by very minute bodies” 
(AT VIIIA 324/CSMI 287).   
Having established the existence of these particles, Descartes explicates how their 
usefulness in explanations justifies claims regarding the way these particles are structured.  
“[S]ome people may be led to ask how I know what these particles are like. Mi reply is 
this… I took the simplest and best known principles, knowledge of which is naturally 
implanted in our minds; and working from these I considered, in general terms, firstly, 
what are the principal differences which can exist between the sizes, shapes and positions 
of bodies which are imperceptible by the senses merely because of their small size, and, 
secondly, what observable effects would result from their various interactions. Later on, 
when I observed just such effects in objects that can be perceived by the senses, I judged 
that they in fact arose from just such an interaction of bodies that cannot be perceived – 
especially since it seemed impossible to think up any other explanation for them… Men 
who are experienced in dealing with machinery can take a particular machine whose 
function they know and, by looking at some of its parts, easily form a conjecture about the 
design of the other parts, which they cannot see. In the same way I have attempted to 
consider the observable effects and parts of natural bodies and track down the 
imperceptible causes and particles which produce them.” (AT VIIIA 326/CSMI 288-289).   
The method consists in inferring, from the observable effects, the causes that better account 
for them. Here we can see that although the unobservable causal structures responsible for 
observable phenomena are posited as suppositions or conjectures, Descartes seems to be very 
confident of the correctness of these conjectures, to the point that it seems impossible to him to be 
mistaken about them. However, this confidence seems to be undermined by the remarks he makes 
in the section right after the one I just cited, where he says that:  
“… although this method may enable us to understand how all the things in nature could 
have arisen, it should not therefore be inferred that they were in fact made in this way. Just 
as the same craftsman could make two clocks which tell the time equally well and look 
completely alike from the outside but have completely different assemblies of wheels 
inside, so the supreme craftsman of the real world could have produced all that we see in 
several different ways. I am very happy to admit this…” (AT VIIIA 327/CSMI 289).  
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This passage appears in section 204, entitled:  
“With regard to the things which cannot be perceived by the senses, it is enough to explain 
their possible nature, even though their actual nature may be different.” (AT VIIIA 
327/CSMI 289). 
So, on the one hand, Descartes says that it seems impossible for these causal explanations to be 
wrong, and on the other, he says that one must not infer that things in fact occur in that way. How 
are we to understand the seemed impossibility that warrants Descartes’ confidence in the 
correctness of the explanations against his admission that it is possible for these explanations to be 
mistaken? In what follows I argue that, contrary to some instrumentalist readings, the possibility 
of these explanations being wrong should be understood merely in a metaphysical sense (from the 
perspective of God, it is possible for these explanations to be wrong), but in no way this warrants 
instrumentalist readings that advocate for skepticism towards unobservable structures. By making 
reference to God’s power, Descartes is drawing a distinction between the metaphysical or absolute 
certainty we can achieve in some domains, namely, the existence of God, humans being thinking 
things, and matter being an extended substance (what he calls Scientia), and the weaker certainty 
that is the goal of the natural sciences.  
§2. Descartes as an Instrumentalist 
2.1. Garber and Empirical Adequacy 
The remarks in section 204 have led some authors to believe that, for Descartes, whether or not 
claims about unobservables are true is not important in explanation. For example, according to 
Daniel Garber:  
“it simply does not matter if the conjectures [i.e. the explanations] are false, as long as they 
agree with the phenomena of experiment and observation. What is important for Descartes 
is now simply that the consequences of his conjectured particular natures agree with 
experience. For if they do, then whether true or false, they can be used to predict future 
experience, and in that way serve as reliable guides to life. In this way we can say that for 
Descartes, experience doesn’t confirm the truth of conjectures about the corpuscular sub- 
structure, but their reliability as predictors of future experience.” (Garber 2001, 127).  
On Garber’s view Descartes’ goal is merely to account for the observable phenomena, regardless 
of whether both the unobservable structures and the causal histories described in the explanations 
actually exist. Beyond the fundamental properties of matter and the laws of movement, Descartes 
would be giving up the quest for knowledge about the unobservable physical world.  
The instrumentalist undertones of Garber’s reading are clear. Instrumentalism is an 
empiricist view. It gives primacy to the evidence directly gathered by the senses or systematic 
organizations of disparate accounts of observable phenomena over the speculations concerning 
unobservable reality. Garber attributes this asymmetry to Descartes. He quotes the Meditations as 
evidence that, for Descartes, despite the fact that the senses can deceive us, they can also be truth-
conducive:  
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“I know that in matters regarding the well-being of the body, all my senses report the truth 
much more frequently than not.” (ATVII 89/CSMII 61).  
But, Garber argues, this is not the case of the unobservable reality:  
“[W]e can’t even say this about our conjectures about hidden natures; for all we know they 
may be genuinely false” (Garber 2001, 128).  
Garber then concludes that, for Descartes:  
“[T]he hidden mechanism, the corpuscular substructure, the real nature of a body has 
become a mere calculating device for predicting future phenomena, and lost the status of 
even being a candidate for knowledge or ignorance; all that really seems to count are the 
phenomena” (Garber 2001, 128). 
2.2. Dellsén and How-Possibly Explanations 
A more recent instrumentalist reading is that of Finnur Dellsén, who argues that:  
“on [Descartes’] conception there is no conflict at all between appealing to a hypothesis in 
an explanation and simultaneously recognizing that it is not true” (Dellsén 2017, 316).  
On Dellsén’s view, Descartes’ goal in the Principles is to present plausible mechanical 
explanations, that is, explanations that align with Cartesian general principles of nature, but these 
explanations do not necessarily correspond to the way things are. In that sense, Dellsén argues, for 
Descartes “theories can explain even if they are not true” (Dellsén 2017, 315).  
In order to explicate his view, Dellsén appeals to a distinction by William Dray (1957) 
between how-possibly and why-actually explanations (see also Salmon 1992, and Cuffaro 2015). 
How-possibly explanations show how things could have happened, given some basic principles of 
nature, but without asserting that they actually happened that way. Why-actually explanations, on 
the other hand, do intend to track down the actual causal history of the phenomenon to be 
explained. To Dellsén’s mind, Cartesian explanations are better described as how-possibly 
explanations (Dellsén 2017, 318). Dellsén quickly points out that this does not mean that for 
Descartes that “any explanation will do, as long as it is mechanical” (2017, 317). Rather: 
“an adequate explanation must also be the clearest and most distinct of the available 
explanations. And of course, the mechanical explanations must also be consistent with the 
observations they explain and be deducible from the laws of motion. However… the 
explanantia in such explanations need not be regarded as true” (2017, 317).  
In Dellsén’s reading, Descartes never thought to make the extra step of inferring, from the clearest 
and most distinct of the available explanations, to its truth. In that sense, Dellsén’s is an 
instrumentalist reading because, according to it, Descartes’ goal was merely to account for the 
observed phenomena, regardless of whether both the unobservable structures and the causal 
histories described in the explanations actually existed. Beyond the principles of movement: 
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“the theories appealed to in Cartesian explanations… do not fall within the scope of 
Descartes’ requirement of certainty” (2017, 326).  
Thus, for Dellsén the ultimate epistemic value of Cartesian explanations is to be “indicative of the 
explanatory power of the first principles” (2017, 321), but these explanations do not justify any 
commitments to the unobservable structures described by them.   
§3. Descartes as a Scientific Realist 
Despite the previous interpretations, a more comprehensive reading shows that the project of the 
Principles goes beyond empirical adequacy, and that there is a further task consisting in finding 
out which of these possible explanations is the correct one. Granted, the task is hard and may not 
always prove to be successful, but Descartes takes it to be the aim of natural inquiry to engage in 
this task with the tools of reason. On this reading, Descartes would be more akin to scientific 
realism, since he relied on the theoretical virtues of his explanations to decide whether or not they 
correctly described the structure of the unobservable physical world.  
There is plenty of textual evidence for this reading. For example, in Part III of Principles 
Descartes appeals to the virtues of generality and fertility: 
“in order to come to know the true nature of this visible world, it is not enough to find 
causes which provide an explanation of what we see far off in the heavens; the selfsame 
causes must also allow everything which we see right here on earth to be deduced from 
them. There is, however, no need for us to consider all these terrestrial phenomena in order 
to determine the causes of more general things. But we shall know that we have determined 
such causes correctly afterwards, when we notice that they serve to explain not only the 
effects which we were originally looking at, but all these other phenomena, which we were 
not thinking of beforehand” (AT VIIIA, 98-99/CSMI 255).  
In addition, Descartes appeals to the virtue of simplicity when he says that:  
“If a cause allows all the phenomena to be clearly deduced from it, then it is virtually 
impossible that it should not be true… We would seem to be doing God an injustice if we 
suspected that the causal explanations discovered in this way were false. For this would 
imply that God had endowed us with such an imperfect nature that even the proper use of 
our powers of reasoning allowed us to go wrong” (AT VIIIA 99/CSMI 255).  
Similarly, in a letter to Jean-Baptiste Morin, Descartes appeals to the virtue of unificatory 
power:  
“while there are indeed many effects to which it is easy to adjust different causes, one to 
the other, it is not always so easy to adjust one single cause to many effects, if it is not the 
actual cause from which they proceed. Indeed, there are often effects which are such that 
to specify one cause from which they can clearly be deduced is sufficient to prove it to be 
their true cause. And I maintain that all of those of which I have spoken are of this sort” 
(cited in McMullin 1990, 37).  
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The paragraph quoted in §1 must also be understood as inferring the correctness of an 
explanation from its intelligibility: 
“[I judge that] such effects in objects that can be perceived by the senses… in fact arose 
from just such an interaction of bodies that cannot be perceived – especially since it seemed 
impossible to think up any other explanation for them.” (AT VIIIA 326/CSMI 288; my 
emphasis).   
Here we see Descartes justifying his commitments to the correctness of his explanations 
by appealing to what we now call theoretical virtues, a move very similar to the ones made by 
contemporary scientific realists. But of course, one may wonder why these virtues are knowledge-
conferring. Unfortunately, Descartes does not explicitly address this issue (which is controversial 
in the contemporary discussion as well!) However, his use of these virtues is certainly not arbitrary. 
For example, the idea of God as immutable gives a sense of the kind of virtues to be considered in 
order to understand God’s creation, namely, simplicity, generality, intelligibility, etc. These virtues 
are also at play when understanding the laws of motion in terms of principles such as 
conservativeness. But in general, it seems that for Descartes is obvious that these are the features 
good explanations must have. 
§4. Retroduction 
According to Ernan McMullin, Descartes was the first philosopher who explicitly acknowledged 
the importance of inferring from plausible explanations of observable phenomena to the causal 
structures posited by these explanations. Following Charles Peirce, McMullin calls this form of 
inference retroduction:  
“[A]s a process of inference, [retroduction…] is not rule-governed as deduction is, nor 
regulated by technique as induction is. Its criteria, like coherence, empirical adequacy, 
fertility, are of a more oblique sort… It is a complex, continuing, sort of inference, 
involving deduction, induction, and abduction” (1992, 92).  
Building upon William Whewell and Peirce, McMullin defines retroduction as involving 
three steps. First, abduction is the process of formulating verifiable causal hypotheses. Then, 
deductions are performed that extract the possible consequences of these causal hypotheses. 
Finally, induction is both the verification of these hypotheses, and the generation of verifiable laws 
that will in turn require a causal explanation. In that sense, induction is an ampliative inference but 
restricted to the observable realm. Via abduction, a causal hypothesis is posited, which includes 
entities, processes and relations that would account for the phenomenon to be explained (which is 
usually a regularity arrived at by induction). Abduction is also an ampliative inference because, if 
successful, it provides a deeper form of understanding, and opens a yet unknown domain.  
Understanding Cartesian explanations as relying on retroductive inferences, as defined by 
McMullin, allows us to see the kind of certainty they confer. Consider the following reconstruction 
of Descartes’ explanation of the behavior of magnets:  
Step 1. Induction: By experience we verify that a set of observed magnets attract each 
other, and by induction we establish that ‘magnets attract each other’. This regularity is the 
explanandum.  
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Because of our clear and distinct ideas about the nature of the material substance, we know 
that the explanation of this regularity must be purely mechanical and must appeal only to the size, 
shape, and motion of particles of matter. What is more, we already have a good argument to 
establish that there are unobservable micro particles, and that our explanation can use them.  
Step 2. Abduction: What else can be inferred from the nature of matter? Not much. Here 
that we must use our imagination, and postulate a hypothesis: magnets emanate screw-shaped 
particles that hook up to one another forming some sort of strings. These strings hook up to the 
strings emanating from the other magnet. Because of the action of vortex forces (which can also 
be explained mechanically), the strings are pulled back, thus creating a force that pulls the magnets 
together.  
Step 3. Deduction: By appealing only to mechanical forces, this causal story can be used 
to deduce the observable behavior of magnet attraction.  
Based on the virtues of this explanation, Descartes justifies his belief that the story in step 
2 is correct and therefore that those screw-shaped particles actually exist and behave as described. 
§5. Natural Explanations and Moral Certainty 
We saw in §1 that Descartes himself admitted that his natural explanations, despite having the 
virtues outlined above, can be false because “the supreme craftsman of the real world could have 
produced all that we see in several different ways” (AT VIIIA 327/CSMI 289). How are we to 
interpret this possibility? In what follows, I argue that for Descartes these explanations can be false 
in the same way that we can be misled by our senses: we could be wrong about what our senses 
inform us, but it is not likely. Similarly, although claims concerning unobservable structures can 
be false, if they play a role in our best explanations of the observable reality, their falsity is very 
unlikely.  
In order to see this point more clearly, we must understand the distinction between absolute 
or metaphysical certainty on the one hand, and moral certainty on the other. In the Principles, 
Descartes defines absolute certainty as the one that “arises when we believe that it is wholly 
impossible that something should be otherwise than we judge it to be” (AT VIIIA 328/CSMI 290). 
Moral certainty, on the other hand, is a certainty sufficient “for application to ordinary life, even 
though [what is morally certain] may be uncertain in relation to the absolute power of God.” (AT 
VIIIA 327/CSMI 289-290). This distinction was already introduced in the Discourse, where 
Descartes explains that morally certain things are those that we cannot doubt “without being 
extravagant” (AT VI, 37-38/CSMI 129-130), although from the perspective of absolute certainty 
“we cannot reasonably deny that there are adequate grounds for not being entirely sure about them” 
(AT VI, 37-38/CSMI 129-130).  
There are few things that can be known with absolute certainty, for example, “that God 
exists” and “that the mind is different from the body” (ATVII 6, CSMII 6). Other things include 
“that I am something”, “that in the future it will be true that I have existed”, “that two and tree 
added together are five”, etc. (cf. AT VII, 21), but our knowledge of these things depends on our 
knowledge of God, “[f]or if [we] do not know this, it seems that [we] can never be quite certain 
about anything else.” (AT VII, 21). If we do not believe in God, all we can hope for achieving is 
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moral certainty. In that sense an atheist, Descartes argues, “will never be free of [doubts about 
these things…] until he acknowledges that God exists.” (AT VII, 141). It is in this context that 
Descartes writes his famous remarks in the Replies: 
“I do not dispute that an atheist clearly apprehends that the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right angles. I maintain only that his cognition is not true science, since no 
cognition that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called science.” (AT VII 141) 
This passage should not be interpreted as if Descartes was claiming that only metaphysical 
certainty is suitable for natural inquiry, with the implication that atheists cannot engage in this 
inquiry. Rather, as Jorge Secada points out, the idea of this passage is that the atheist clearly 
apprehends (clare cognoscere) some relatively simple geometrical matter, but lacks “true science 
(veram scientiam)”, because her cognitions can be rendered (metaphysically) doubtful (Secada 
2009). The key point is that Descartes distinguishes between Scientia, which is a kind of cognition 
that is indubitable, evident, and absolutely certain (Pasnau 2017, 23), something that only him and 
a handful of other people has ever achieved (see Pasnau 2017, 24), and the clear cognitions of an 
atheist, which are not Scientia.  
Now, there are many things about which moral certainty is the best that can be achieved, 
even if after going the meditational process outlined in Meditations one has become a true believer 
in God. Among these things are, for example, the existence of the external world as a whole, and 
the existence of the objects of our sensory perceptions. As he puts it in the introduction to 
Meditations:  
“[In the sixth meditation] there is a presentation of all the arguments which enable the 
existence of material things to be inferred. The great benefit of these arguments is not, in 
my view, that they prove what they establish – namely that there really is a world, and that 
human beings have bodies and so on – since no sane person has ever seriously doubted 
these things. The point is that in considering these arguments we come to realize that they 
are not as solid or as transparent as the arguments which lead us to knowledge of our own 
minds and of God, so that the later are the most certain and evident of all possible objects 
of knowledge for the human intellect.” (AT VII, 15-16/CSM II, 11)  
The unobservable causal structures posited by natural explanations are also the kind of 
things that can only be known with moral certainty. Support of this view comes from a section in 
the Principles entitled “Nevertheless my explanations appear to be at least morally certain”, where 
Descartes provides the following examples that clearly illustrate the kind of certainty he sought in 
his natural explanations:  
“<Thus, those who never been in Rome have no doubt that it is a town in Italy, even though 
it could be the case that everyone who has told them this has been deceiving them.> 
Suppose for example that someone wants to read a letter written in Latin but encoded so 
that the letters of the alphabet do not have their proper value, and he guesses that the letter 
B should be read whenever A appears, and C when B appears, i.e. that each letter should 
be replaced by the one immediately following it. If, by using this key, he can make up Latin 
words from the letters, he will be in no doubt that the true meaning of the letter is contained 
in these words, it is true that his knowledge is based merely on a conjecture, and it is 
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conceivable that the writer did not replace the original letters with their immediate 
successors in the alphabet, but with others, thus encoding quite a different message; but 
this possibility is so unlikely <especially if the message contains many words> that it does 
not seem credible>.” (AT VIIIA 327-28/CSM I 289-90).  
The idea of this passage is that, although we may never know with absolute certainty whether we 
found the real meaning of the letter, or whether Rome is actually a city in Italy, it would be absurd 
to think otherwise given the fact that the truth of our beliefs about the meaning of the letter or 
about Rome better explains the available evidence.  
Evidently, neither the Rome case nor the letter case are fully analogous to the case of 
unobservable structures, for in the first two it is in principle possible to verify the truth of our 
beliefs either by going to Rome or by asking the author of the letter directly, whereas this is not 
available with respect to our beliefs about unobservables. However, the fact that Descartes uses 
examples based on unobserved structures to illustrate the moral certainty of natural explanations 
is significant. It suggests that in some cases hypothesizing about unobserved structures is 
epistemically analogous to hypothesizing about unobservable structures:  as long as we have a 
good hypothesis (a hypothesis having certain acceptable theoretical virtues), it would be 
extravagant not to believe in its truth. The explanations must be simple (the hypothesis that all 
from whom the people who’s never been in Rome got their information about the city were 
deceived is too complicated), general (the more words the letter has, the more likely the 
interpretation is the correct one), etc. In the case of natural explanations, these virtues feature in 
the highest degree, and for this reason having these explanatory virtues grants being morally 
certain about these hypotheses being correct.  
Now, Descartes’ own explication of natural explanations is a little bit misleading. He 
claims that they are carried out via deduction from the principles of shape, size, position and 
motion of matter: 
“there is nothing in the whole of nature (nothing, that is, which should be referred to purely 
corporeal causes, i.e. those devoid of thought and mind) which is incapable of being 
deductively explained on the basis of these selfsame principles” (AT VIIIA 315/CSM I 
279; my emphasis).   
One way of reading this passage is as if Descartes’ goal was to know these unobservable 
structures with absolute certainty, thus extending the ideal of absolute certainty from metaphysics 
to the natural sciences. After all, if explanations of natural phenomena are deductions from the 
material principles of size, shape, and motion, and if these principles are themselves deduced from 
absolutely certain beliefs such as the existence of God, the nature of matter as an extended 
substance, and of humans as thinking things, then our knowledge of the unobservable structures 
posited by these natural explanations would inherit the epistemic strength of those rational beliefs. 
In the Principles, for example, he suggests that these explanations are not just morally, but 
absolutely certain:  
“[P]erhaps even these results of mine will be allowed into the class of absolute certainties, 
if people consider how they have been deduced in an unbroken chain from the first and 
simplest principles of human knowledge… it seems that all the other phenomena, or at 
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least the general features of the universe and the earth which I have described, can hardly 
be intelligibly explained except in the way I have suggested” (AT VIIIA 328-29/CSM I 
290-91).  
If the explanations are deductions from principles we know with absolute certainty, our knowledge 
of the micro structures they posit should be metaphysically certain, and not simply morally certain. 
I believe, however, that this passage does not warrant this conclusion. Descartes starts 
saying that all other phenomena have been deduced from the principles, but then immediately 
backs off and narrows the scope of his assertion, focusing only on “the general features of the 
universe and the earth”, and even for these cases he qualifies the knowledge he has about them 
with hardly. Part of the issue is that Descartes mistakenly describes his own method of explanation 
as purely deductive. For starters, it is impossible to deduce every phenomenon from a fixed set of 
principles without taking the initial conditions into account, which can only be apprehended by 
experience. But more importantly, as we have seen, in his own practice of advancing natural 
explanations Descartes appeals to retroduction, which is a mode of inference that is not purely 
deductive. For example, although it may be in principle possible to deduce (what Descartes’ 
thought to be) the fact that magnets emanate screw-shaped particles, in practice this cannot be 
done. Rather, this can only be hypothesized as the best plausible explanation of magnetic 
attraction. It is true that, according to Descartes at least, from this hypothesis magnetic attraction 
deductively follows, but this does not mean that the shape of those particles was inferred from the 
principles of size, shape and motion. As he points out at the end of Meditations: 
“[I]t must be admitted that in this human life we are often liable to make mistakes about 
particular things, and we must acknowledge the weakness of our nature” (AT VII 90/CSM 
II 62) 
§6. Conclusion 
There is an ongoing debate regarding whether Descartes had at some point in time hoped that he 
could extend this ideal of absolute certainty to the natural sciences by actually deducing all natural 
phenomena from the principles of God, humans as thinking things, and matter as an extended 
substance, or rather, that he never thought this to be possible (see Dellsén 2017 for an overview). 
Despite this debate, there is wide consensus that, at least in the Principles, Descartes’ goal was not 
to actually deduce all the observable effects from these three principles mentioned above. In that 
sense, the kind of natural inquiry introduced in the Principles is not Scientia. Now, as Pasnau 
convincingly argues (2017, 25), if Descartes had thought that only the products of Scientia are 
knowledge, he would have been a skeptic, because we would have held that we lack knowledge 
concerning almost everything, including for example that there is an external world. But he was 
not such a skeptic. Rather, he thought that we can indeed acquire knowledge of things outside the 
domain of Scientia. What I have shown in this chapter can be interpreted under this light: the fact 
that, from a metaphysical perspective, we could be wrong about natural explanations, does not 
entail that it is not possible to know that the microstructures cited by natural explanations exist. If 
the conjectures have the right explanatory virtues, then we can be morally certain that the posited 
microparticles are indeed arranged in the way described. For Descartes it would be an extravagant 
form of skepticism to think otherwise, as extravagant as the kind of skepticism of the person who 
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